diff options
Diffstat (limited to '')
| -rw-r--r-- | verifier.cpp | 50 |
1 files changed, 25 insertions, 25 deletions
diff --git a/verifier.cpp b/verifier.cpp index 996a1fdf9..401bd7e3e 100644 --- a/verifier.cpp +++ b/verifier.cpp @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ #include <algorithm> #include <memory> +#include <android-base/logging.h> #include <openssl/bn.h> #include <openssl/ecdsa.h> #include <openssl/obj_mac.h> @@ -131,24 +132,24 @@ int verify_file(unsigned char* addr, size_t length, #define FOOTER_SIZE 6 if (length < FOOTER_SIZE) { - LOGE("not big enough to contain footer\n"); + LOG(ERROR) << "not big enough to contain footer"; return VERIFY_FAILURE; } unsigned char* footer = addr + length - FOOTER_SIZE; if (footer[2] != 0xff || footer[3] != 0xff) { - LOGE("footer is wrong\n"); + LOG(ERROR) << "footer is wrong"; return VERIFY_FAILURE; } size_t comment_size = footer[4] + (footer[5] << 8); size_t signature_start = footer[0] + (footer[1] << 8); - LOGI("comment is %zu bytes; signature %zu bytes from end\n", - comment_size, signature_start); + LOG(INFO) << "comment is " << comment_size << " bytes; signature is " << signature_start + << " bytes from end"; if (signature_start <= FOOTER_SIZE) { - LOGE("Signature start is in the footer"); + LOG(ERROR) << "Signature start is in the footer"; return VERIFY_FAILURE; } @@ -159,7 +160,7 @@ int verify_file(unsigned char* addr, size_t length, size_t eocd_size = comment_size + EOCD_HEADER_SIZE; if (length < eocd_size) { - LOGE("not big enough to contain EOCD\n"); + LOG(ERROR) << "not big enough to contain EOCD"; return VERIFY_FAILURE; } @@ -175,7 +176,7 @@ int verify_file(unsigned char* addr, size_t length, // magic number $50 $4b $05 $06. if (eocd[0] != 0x50 || eocd[1] != 0x4b || eocd[2] != 0x05 || eocd[3] != 0x06) { - LOGE("signature length doesn't match EOCD marker\n"); + LOG(ERROR) << "signature length doesn't match EOCD marker"; return VERIFY_FAILURE; } @@ -186,7 +187,7 @@ int verify_file(unsigned char* addr, size_t length, // the real one, minzip will find the later (wrong) one, // which could be exploitable. Fail verification if // this sequence occurs anywhere after the real one. - LOGE("EOCD marker occurs after start of EOCD\n"); + LOG(ERROR) << "EOCD marker occurs after start of EOCD"; return VERIFY_FAILURE; } } @@ -235,12 +236,11 @@ int verify_file(unsigned char* addr, size_t length, uint8_t* signature = eocd + eocd_size - signature_start; size_t signature_size = signature_start - FOOTER_SIZE; - LOGI("signature (offset: 0x%zx, length: %zu): %s\n", - length - signature_start, signature_size, - print_hex(signature, signature_size).c_str()); + LOG(INFO) << "signature (offset: " << std::hex << (length - signature_start) << ", length: " + << signature_size << "): " << print_hex(signature, signature_size); if (!read_pkcs7(signature, signature_size, &sig_der, &sig_der_length)) { - LOGE("Could not find signature DER block\n"); + LOG(ERROR) << "Could not find signature DER block"; return VERIFY_FAILURE; } @@ -271,38 +271,38 @@ int verify_file(unsigned char* addr, size_t length, if (key.key_type == Certificate::KEY_TYPE_RSA) { if (!RSA_verify(hash_nid, hash, key.hash_len, sig_der, sig_der_length, key.rsa.get())) { - LOGI("failed to verify against RSA key %zu\n", i); + LOG(INFO) << "failed to verify against RSA key " << i; continue; } - LOGI("whole-file signature verified against RSA key %zu\n", i); + LOG(INFO) << "whole-file signature verified against RSA key " << i; free(sig_der); return VERIFY_SUCCESS; } else if (key.key_type == Certificate::KEY_TYPE_EC && key.hash_len == SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) { if (!ECDSA_verify(0, hash, key.hash_len, sig_der, sig_der_length, key.ec.get())) { - LOGI("failed to verify against EC key %zu\n", i); + LOG(INFO) << "failed to verify against EC key " << i; continue; } - LOGI("whole-file signature verified against EC key %zu\n", i); + LOG(INFO) << "whole-file signature verified against EC key " << i; free(sig_der); return VERIFY_SUCCESS; } else { - LOGI("Unknown key type %d\n", key.key_type); + LOG(INFO) << "Unknown key type " << key.key_type; } i++; } if (need_sha1) { - LOGI("SHA-1 digest: %s\n", print_hex(sha1, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH).c_str()); + LOG(INFO) << "SHA-1 digest: " << print_hex(sha1, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH); } if (need_sha256) { - LOGI("SHA-256 digest: %s\n", print_hex(sha256, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH).c_str()); + LOG(INFO) << "SHA-256 digest: " << print_hex(sha256, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH); } free(sig_der); - LOGE("failed to verify whole-file signature\n"); + LOG(ERROR) << "failed to verify whole-file signature"; return VERIFY_FAILURE; } @@ -323,7 +323,7 @@ std::unique_ptr<RSA, RSADeleter> parse_rsa_key(FILE* file, uint32_t exponent) { } if (key_len_words > 8192 / 32) { - LOGE("key length (%d) too large\n", key_len_words); + LOG(ERROR) << "key length (" << key_len_words << ") too large"; return nullptr; } @@ -479,7 +479,7 @@ std::unique_ptr<EC_KEY, ECKEYDeleter> parse_ec_key(FILE* file) { bool load_keys(const char* filename, std::vector<Certificate>& certs) { std::unique_ptr<FILE, decltype(&fclose)> f(fopen(filename, "r"), fclose); if (!f) { - LOGE("opening %s: %s\n", filename, strerror(errno)); + PLOG(ERROR) << "error opening " << filename; return false; } @@ -529,14 +529,14 @@ bool load_keys(const char* filename, std::vector<Certificate>& certs) { return false; } - LOGI("read key e=%d hash=%d\n", exponent, cert.hash_len); + LOG(INFO) << "read key e=" << exponent << " hash=" << cert.hash_len; } else if (cert.key_type == Certificate::KEY_TYPE_EC) { cert.ec = parse_ec_key(f.get()); if (!cert.ec) { return false; } } else { - LOGE("Unknown key type %d\n", cert.key_type); + LOG(ERROR) << "Unknown key type " << cert.key_type; return false; } @@ -548,7 +548,7 @@ bool load_keys(const char* filename, std::vector<Certificate>& certs) { } else if (ch == EOF) { break; } else { - LOGE("unexpected character between keys\n"); + LOG(ERROR) << "unexpected character between keys"; return false; } } |